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NATURAL PROVIDENCE:
REPLY TO DEMBSKI
Michael J. Murray

In No Free Lunch William Dembski presents a reply to the argument against
intelligent design theory (IDT) I offered in "Natural Providence (or Design
Trouble)." In this essay I reply to Dembski and describe a brief proposal for a
model of providence that might be more congenial to the advocate of TOT.

In "Natural Providence (or Design Trouble)" I presented arguments defending the claim that the alternatives to methodological naturalism
which have been defended by friends of Intelligent Design Theory (lOT)
should be rejected. 1 In making this argument, I commended a Leibnizian conception of providence according to which the states of the natural
world, excluding those caused directly by free creatures, come about by
means of God's creation of the initial state of the universe and the subsequent unfolding of the succeeding states via nomically regular processes.
As a result, when we seek to explain states of affairs in the natural world,
we should do so by appeal to the existence of natural entities and their
powers. William Dembski has published a reply to this argument. I argue
here that the reply is not convincing.
The argument I present in "Natural Providence" had two stages. First,
I argued that since most states of affairs (at least those not caused by free
human agents) come to be via nomically regular means, and since there
is no way for the scientist to distinguish empirically between those states
generated by nomically regular means and those caused by direct divine
intervention, properly scientific explanations will be naturalistic. Second, I
argued that since there are some suggestive, if not compelling, reasons for
thinking that God would create the world in Leibnizian fashion, scientists
who are theists should favor naturalistic explanations in science. This pair
of arguments should at least make the scientist who is also a theist wary, to
say the least, of proposals to jettison methodological naturalism in science.
I argued for the claim of the first stage by focusing on a case in which
one player in a poker game repeatedly draws four aces, thereby winning
every hand. It would be clear to anyone who was shown the outcomes
of each round that the apparently fortunate player had cheated. That is,
it would be clear that intelligent agency has been involved in securing
the outcomes. However, there would be no way of knowing whether the
result had come about as a result of some intervention by the cheater, or
rather by allowing the cheater to have access to the cards before the game
so that he could stack the deck. The empirical evidence simply will not
allow this discrimination. Of course, the same will be true when we are
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talking about the natural world, where the intelligent agent is not a card
player, but the creator. As a result, there is no reason to favor explanations
of apparently designed states of affairs in nature by appeal to divine intervention. When we combine this result with the fact that the universe seems
almost unexceptionally nomically regular, and that there are good reasons
for God to create and govern the world via nomically regular means, the
theist has good reason to retain methodological naturalism as a constraint
in scientific theorizing.
Dembski offers two replies. First, he claims that even though intervention and deck-stacking might be empirically equivalent, we should only
favor deck-stacking explanations when we can trace the information content necessary to produce the apparently designed state back to the beginning. He considers, for example, the Cambrian explosion, a five to ten million year span of natural history when most of the basic metazoan body
plans emerged. This rapid increase in biological complexity seems to have
emerged out of quite simple precursor conditions. If we measure such
complexity in terms of information content we might say, as Dembski
does, that "the information needed to build the animals of the Cambrian
period was suddenly expressed at that time and with no evident informational precursors." 2 We might assume that the necessary complexity was
somehow programmed into precursor states in a way that is opaque to us,
but "there is no evidence for it and there is no reason ... to think that all
naturally occurring information must be traceable back in this way.":;
The conclusion of this line of reasoning seems to be this: unless we have
reason to think that precursor states contain the information content necessary to produce the apparently designed state, we should assume that the
information content is imparted when it first becomes manifest. Perhaps
that's true. However, in this case there are prima facie reasons to think that
the information content necessary to produce such complex states is present prior to its manifestation, namely the reasons I offered: first, that this
is the only way to generate such complexity through the pattern of providence we see across times and places, that is, through nomically regular
natural processes, and second, that there are good reasons for thinking
that God would favor a world which unfolds by nomic ally regular means.
Until we deal with those arguments, Dembski's conclusion will have no
traction against my argument.
In his second reply, Dembski argues that even though intervention and
deck-stacking are empirically equivalent, there are other values in theory
choice that might tip the balance towards explanations that invoke intervention. As he notes, the hypothesis that the world was created five minutes ago with all of the apparent signs of age it has, is empirically equivalent to the reigning cosmological hypothesis that the world is fourteen
billion years old. Yet this does not lead us to throw up our hands when it
comes to deciding between the two.
Fair enough. But Dembski does nothing to tell us which other theoretical values we should bring to bear. As a result, we might fairly say
that consistency, simplicity, and scope, to name three oft-cited theoretical
values, would tend to favor deck-stacking explanations over intervention
explanations. After all such naturalistic explanations are in fact the correct
explanations in nearly every case. In addition, as I have noted, the theist
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has additional reasons for thinking that a Leibnizian conception of natural
providence is to be preferred.
In order to mount a response to the argument I offered, Dembski and
other friends of IDT will need to say something about those additional
reasons. I think there is more to be said, and not all of it is favorable to the
view I have defended. Since I was defending the Leibnizian position in
"Natural Providence" I was not inclined to highlight the considerations
unfavorable to my view. But I think that they are worth considering. As a
result, I herewith offer the friends of IDT some suggestions which might
provide a better angle of attack.
As I have said, the two reasons I cited for favoring the Leibnizian pichue, and thus methodological naturalism in science, are that it seems to
cohere with the order of things we find in nature, and that there are reasons for thinking that God would orchestrate the affairs of the natural
world in such a way. Let's leave aside the first reason since it is really more
of a tie breaking reason when we have empirically equivalent explanations. What does the second reason amount to? As I cast the exchange between Newton and Leibniz on the issue of providence over nature, Leibniz makes heavy weather over the fact that the Newtonian God appears to
be a designer of less than adequate competence. What sort of God would
actualize a creation which would require periodic intervention to keep
things from collapsing into disorder and chaos? Leibniz's answer: only
one with less than perfect knowledge, power, or goodness.
There is something very attractive about this position. When I bought
my first car, the manufacturer recommended a tune up every twenty thousand miles or so. Cars rolling off the assembly line today hardly need anything like a tune up. With many of these cars, the sort of routine service
that would in the past be required every twenty thousand miles, need
only be done every fifty or one hundred thousand miles. Better engineers
with greater understanding and better raw materials are now producing
better cars. And I think we suppose that were General Motors to take on
a few omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good engineers, cars would be
utterly maintenance free (less than wholly good engineers might be able
to design such cars, but undoubtedly their greed would get the better of
them). The same intuition underlies the Leibnizian picture. If God knows
how to bring about all of the states of affairs he wishes to bring about in
the course of natural history by deck-staking, what would motivate the
creation of a universe that was in need of periodic tune ups?
Dembski addresses this issue in passing in the same book when he responds to Howard Van Till. Like Leibniz, Van Till argues that the interventionist picture requires appeal to a God who cannot, or at least refuses,
to provide creation with all that it needs to accomplish its ends. Dembski
contends that this may be a fair criticism of the interventionist picture if
we conceive of the relation between God and world on analogy with that
between clockmaker and clock. But why focus on this analogy? Perhaps
we should instead think of it on the analogy of musician and instrument.
In that case, deck-stacking seems rather perverse. Why would we form the
expectation that a perfect pianist would create a player piano, rather than
one which required the activity of the musician to perform its function?4 I
suspect that many readers will find that the musician analogy unappeal-
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ing, motioning, as it does, in the direction of something like process theism.
Still, Dembski's point here bears further scrutiny. We can imagine someone arguing with Van Till, or Leibniz, or me, in the following way:
While mechanistic philosophers of the seventeenth century might
have been inclined towards the analogy of clockmaking, there is
surely something perverse about such a picture. For the Christian
at least, creation is in large part a love story. God's overflowing love
and goodness leads him to create a world into which he intends to
continue to pour forth his love and goodness. The creation is a child,
a bride, a lover, not a mechanical curiosity to be displayed on the
mantle of the divine living room. If creation is created for relationship, the perversity of the Leibnizian picture becomes especially apparent. Imagine that we are introduced to someone with whom we
want to develop a deep and fulfilling relationship of love. God then
pulls us aside and offers us the following choice. Since God knows
everything that will happen in the life of this person he can offer you
two options. First, you can enter this relationship and live with your
beloved, laboring with them and sharing in their joys, passions, and
sorrows. Second, God can tell you up front everything that will ever
happen to them, and then you can assist God in designing an automaton which will look and act like you, and which will live with
your beloved and interact with them in just the way you would if
you were actually present. You can then leave your beloved behind
and go off to watch the drama unfold by webcam at the beach in
Bermuda. Which would you choose? Why of course it is the first!
Why? Because what we desire in love is not simply the well-being of
the beloved, or the opportunity to help the beloved achieve fulfillment, but the experience of actively loving the beloved as well. That
is why a loving God would surely find a Leibnizian conception of
providence repugnant.
The words of this imaginary critic are powerful. One might reply that they
are only powerful insofar as they concern God's relationship with persons,
not the natural world itself. But the Christian will have a hard time accepting this restriction, especially in light of the Biblical emphasis on God's
passion for redeeming all of creation. Redemption of persons surely has a
special place in providence, but not an exclusive one.
I do not intend to try to resolve the question of which analogy is most
apt. However, it seems to me that friends of lOT would do well to focus more on these questions. If the slim evidence we have only provides
us with reasons for a deck-stacking picture of natural providence, then
methodological naturalism should be favored. If the evidence tips in another direction, perhaps it should not. Friends of lOT owe us the contraryevidence. 5

University of Notre Darnel
Franklin and Marshall College

341

NATURAL PROVIDENCE
NOTES

1. Faith and Philosophy, Volume 20, no.2 (July 2003), pp. 307-27.
2. William Dembski, No Free Lunch Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2001), p. 345.
3. Ibid., p. 346.
4. Ibid., p. 328.
5. Special thanks are due to the Note Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion and the American Philosophical Society both of which provided support
for the leave during which this essay was written. Thanks also to William
Hasker for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

